GPUStack: loopback trust allows unauthenticated administrator access, now listed as known exploited (CVE-2026-102895, GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr)
Identifiers: CVE-2026-102895 · GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr
- Published
- Last substantive change
- Last verified
Last verified: . Attention items are due for re-verification within 72 hours.
Summary
The GPUStack project published its advisory on 31 July 2026 and updated it on 29 September 2026. On 9 November 2026 CISA added the issue to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; this is a new listing, not a new vulnerability. Affected is GPUStack (the gpustack package) before 2.2.0, regardless of how it was installed; pip is the ecosystem named in the advisory, but container deployments running the same vulnerable gpustack code can be affected too. The verified vendor fix is 2.2.0. With the default setting force_auth_localhost set to false, requests that appear to come from the local machine are automatically trusted as an administrator. A reverse proxy running on the same host can make external traffic appear local without any forged header, and a client-controlled X-GPUStack-Real-IP header can also influence the recorded source address.
Impact
Full administrator access without authentication, including access to secrets and administrator API keys, plus administrator backend functionality that allows code execution on worker hosts.
Who is affected
Small and medium businesses running GPUStack as part of AI infrastructure behind a website or application, not websites in general. Most exposed are deployments before 2.2.0 with the default localhost trust and a same-host reverse proxy or any reachability from untrusted networks.
Products and versions
| Products and versions | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| GPUStack / gpustack | < 2.2.0 | 2.2.0 |
Exploitation evidence
Exploitation reported. The upstream project explicitly observed exploitation in the wild against version 2.1.1, and the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities listing confirms known exploitation. This does not mean every version or host has been compromised.
Actions
- Perform a controlled but urgent update to 2.2.0 or a newer fixed release and verify the version actually deployed at runtime.
- If the update must be delayed, set force_auth_localhost to true, ensure proxy handling is trustworthy and strips untrusted real-IP headers, and keep the API off untrusted networks through a VPN or edge authentication; these are layered vendor mitigations, and stripping headers alone does not close the same-host proxy path.
- Have the provider or operator review for unexpected users, administrator API keys, custom backends and secrets, and revoke or rotate from a trusted recovery position as needed; the patch does not undo existing keys or a prior compromise.
Unknowns
- Which specific deployments, configurations or proxy layouts a given business actually runs.
- Whether any particular instance was compromised before patching; not all versions or hosts are confirmed affected in practice.
Sources
Change history
- — Published: Added 10 November 2026 after the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities listing of 9 November 2026; the original project advisory of 31 July 2026, updated 29 September 2026, is a distinct earlier publication.